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Rationality and Voting 0 
RICHARD HARTWIG •• 
Wesleyan University 
Several years ago, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony 
Downs concluded that voting is likely to be an irrational act for an in-
dividual.1 That is, the likelihood that a single vote will determine the 
outcome of a national election is extremely small. Even granting a free 
election and a significant perceived difference between candidates or 
political parties, the costs of making up one's mind and going to the 
polls are likely to exceed the individual's probable utility or gain in terms 
of influencing the outcome of the election. Voting may thus be irrational 
in the economic sense of maximizing utility. Downs' argument has 
spawned a series of attempts by mathematically-oriented formal theorists 
to demonstrate and operationalize the thesis that voting can indeed be 
considered rational. Several such attempts have appeared as articles in 
the American Political Science Review. 2 Of particular interest here is the 
September, 1975 issue of the APSR, which contained an article by Gerald 
Strom, a accompanied by four commentaries on a previous article deal-
ing with the same subject, entitled "The Paradox of Not Voting: A 
Decision-Theoretic Analysis," by Ferejohn and Fiorina. 3 
• A revision of a paper presented at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the South Carolina 
Political Science Association. 
• 
0 I would like to thank Thomas Halper and George Graham for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp . 273-274. 
2 See William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of 
Voting," American Political Science Review 62 ( March 1968): 25-42; John A. Fere-
john and Morris P. Fiorina, "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic 
Analysis," ibid. 68 (June 1974): 525-536; and Gerald S. Strom, "On the Apparent 
Paradox of Participation: A New Proposal," ibid . 69 ( September 1975): 908-913. 
"Rational Behavior in Politics: Evidence from a Three-Person Game," by Riker and 
William James Zavoina, ibid. 64 ( March 1970) : 48-60, is a more sophisticated sequel 
to the Riker and Ordeshook article. See also Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political 
Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," ibid. 63 
(December 1969): 1106-1119. (Shapiro avoids many of the traps into which other 
formal theorists have fallen.) The most recent article of this genre in the APSR is 
"A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting," by Norman Frolich , 
Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith, and Oran R. Young, 72 (March 1978): 178-197. 
3 The responses to the Ferejohn and Fiorina paper, found in the Sept., 1975 
issue of the APSR, are: "The Paradox of Not Voting: Comment," by Stephen V. 
Stephens, pp. 914-915; "Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions?" by 
Lawrence S. Mayer, pp. 916-917; "The Paradox of Minimax Regret," by Nathaniel 
Beck, p. 918; and "The Paradox of Not Voting for Oneself," by Gordon Tullock, p . 
919. Also in the same issue are Ferejohn and Fiorina's rejoinder: "Closeness Counts 
Only in Horseshoes and Dancing," pp. 920-925; and "The Ethical Voter," by R. E. 
Goodin and K. W. S. Roberts, pp. 926-928. 
I 
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Ferejohn and Fiorina argue that voting can be considered rational 
( defined as purposeful) behavior by setting aside the usual criterion of 
maximizing utility. They propose a "minimax regret" principle , on the 
basis of which the rational citizen votes not because he holds any illu-
sions about influencing the results of the election , but because of a cal-
culation of the degree of regret he would feel if his candidate lost by a 
single vote. One of the commentaries on this article is by Stephen 
Stephens , who in two memorable pages utterly destroys the "minimax 
regret" principle. He attacks this particular piece on its own grounds , 
but in passing , Stephens inserts a single sentence which-to my mind-
seriously damages most of the APSR articles on the subject . He writes: 
We cannot pause to consider whether the voting act , any more 
than the sex act or any other darkly functional social behavior 
suffused with myth and ritual, is adequately treated with economic 
categories . 4 
Stephens ' point will be clear to anyone familiar with the literature 
of Psychology or Anthropology, with functionalism in Sociology and 
Political Science, or with discussions of symbolic politics. Murray Edel-
man (The Symbolic Uses of Politics) writes that politics always takes 
place on two distinct , but interrelated levels. On one level, politics is the 
calculating struggle for tangible benefits-for money, power and prestige . 
In this "real" world, feedback exists. Actions have direct , observable 
consequences , and mistakes can be corrected. ( On this level, politics 
may be aptly described in terms of [economic] means-end rationality.) 
On a second level, however, politics consists of a series of pictures in 
the mind, of media images with emotional content. The pictures gen-
erated by the news media take place in a world with which the mass 
public has no direct contact , yet one which its members come to fear 
and applaud. Since politics in this sense is obviously important , yet 
remote, its processes are ideal objects for the displacement of private 
emotions , especially strong anxieties and hopes. 11 On this level, economic 
categories are not appropriate . The means-end distinction breaks down , 
and efficiency-in terms of which economic rationality is usually eval-
uated-is not a relevant criterion. 
It seems strange that a series of articles in the most prestigious of 
American political science journals could sustain serious damage from a 
4 Stephens, p. 914. 
Ii MWTay Edelman , The Symbolic Uses of Politics, ( Urbana : University of Illinois 
Press, 1964), p . 5, citing Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New 
York 1930), pp . 75-76. 
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single sentence. The objective of this paper is to explain how and why 
this could happen, and to suggest an alternative approach to the problem 
of rationality and voting. More specifically, I suggest that positivist voting 
analysts would do well to base their work upon a more comprehensive 
understanding of "rationality." 6 
There is little question that formal theorists understand why people 
vote as well as do other political scientists. Gordon Tullock, for example, 
writes that there is a tendency to vote because of social pressure to do 
so, and that people have been socialized in such a fashion that they 
feel good after having voted. 7 The real problem, it seems to me, is that 
these theorists begin with a technique-that of mathematical analysis-
and this technique implies a particular theoretical, and indeed phil-
osophical position. The best-known way to explain and describe voting 
with numbers is to adopt economic categories, and to consider the voting 
act in terms of utility. 8 This in tum implies an economic definition of 
"rationality." However , since the entire meaning of voting cannot be 
explained in terms of rational choice by using Downs' definition of 
economic rationality, the formal theorists expand their definitions of the 
concept. In so doing, they misunderstand and distort the meaning of 
"rationality," plunge into realms where numbers may easily be mislead-
ing, and arrive at descriptions of the voting act which fly in the face 
6 For such an understanding, see Paul Diesing, Reason in Society ( Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1962; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1975). 
7 Tullock, p. 919. Some of these theorists do seem to misunderstand the nature 
of the voting act, however. Riker and Zavoina, for example, in the otherwise useful 
article cited above, write that "political followers, when they act politically ( as in 
voting), are mainly engaged in joining coalitions. Hence the same activity of making 
coalitions is very much like the essential activity of politics." Ibid., p. 51. In saying 
this, they miss Edelman's point about politics occurring on two different levels. 
True enough, politics as the struggle for tangible benefits may resemble coalition 
games, but it would talce a very special coalition game to simulate the "remoteness" 
of election politics for most people and the resultant lack of reliable feedback. 
Edelman. pp. 6-7, describes the function of remoteness in facilitating the employ-
ment of condensation symbols-as opposed to referential symbols. ( Referential 
symbols are quick ways of referring to objective elements in a given situation-i.e. 
elements which different people in different situations identify in the same way. 
Condensation symbols evoke the emotions associated with the situation). Condensation 
symbols are less important where the immediate environment serves as a check on 
reality-as in mostl coalition games. In such games, one knows what is at stalce and 
mistalces can be corrected. Most voters, however, cannot directly verify their im-
pressions of candidates or policies. 
8 Riker and Ordeshook (p. 2.5, ft. 2) note that Downs' theory is characterized 
as positive, but not descriptive. Thus, there is no reason to expect descriptive ac-
curacy, "although in science one would expect to discard positive theories that are 
inadequate as descriptions." They go on to say that Gordon Tullock's theory of 
voting, in Toward a Mathematics of Politics ( University of Michigan Press, 1968) 
Ch. 7, is intended to be descriptive. What seems inappropriate is these writers' 
insistence that an adequate theory must explain everything . 
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of common sense and observed experience-not to speak of the psy-
chological literature on voting. 9 
To begin, it is instructive to compare the ways in which Anthony 
Downs and Ferejohn/Fiorina employ the concept "rationality." Downs, 
writing in 1957, dedicates eight pages to a careful explication of his 
usage of the term. He initially defines rational action as that which is 
reasonably directed toward the achievement of conscious goals. What 
is most significant is that Downs limits himself to a narrowly economic 
view of rationality. Economic analysis, he notes, involves the fitting of 
means to ends. However, if multiple goals exist, means appropriate to 
one goal may block the attainment of another goal, and no unique course 
will be available to the rational decision-maker. To avoid this difficulty, 
it is assumed that firms maximize profits and consumers maximize utility. 
The term "rational" is applied only to means, not to ends, a point which 
follows from the definition of "rational" action as efficient action. An 
economically rational man is thus one who moves toward his goals in 
a manner which, to the best of his knowledge, uses the least possible 
input of scarce resources per unit of valued output. Downs wishes to 
avoid the circular conclusion that every man's behavior is always rational 
because: "1) it is aimed at some end and 2) its returns must have out-
weighed its costs in his eyes or he would not have undertaken it." 10 
To avoid this pitfall, Downs focuses only upon the explicit political or 
economic goals of the particular individual or group. He gives the ex-
ample of a man who for political reasons prefers one party, but votes 
for another to keep his wife from having tantrums. Such behavior, he 
notes, is quite rational personally for this man, but in Downs' model is 
considered irrational because it employs a political device for a non-
political purpose." 11 
In contrast to Downs, Ferejohn and Fiorina devote only one sen-
tence of a footnote to explaining their use of "rationality." They say that 
". . . we use the expression 'rational behavior' in a nontechnical sense 
denoting purposeful behavior." 12 The objective of their article is to 
demonstrate that voting can indeed be considered rational behavior, but 
upon close examination, a very curious fact appears. The "minimax-
regret" principle means in essence that the rational citizen votes because 
be doesn't want to feel bad, not because he thinks that he bas any real 
9 For citations to the key literature from both the "rational" and "psychological" 
schools of voting behavior, see H. T. Reynolds, "Rationality and Attitudes Toward 
Political Parties and Candidates," Journal of Politics 37 (November 1974): 983-1005. 
10 Downs, p. 7, 
11 This summary of Downs' position is from pp. 4-11 of his book. 
12 P. 52.5. 
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chance of influencing the election. In other words , Ferejohn and Fiorina 's 
"rational voter" is employing a political device for a non-political pur-
pose-Le. to keep from feeling bad. This is precisely what Downs con-
siders irrational behavior in his more carefully defined model. What 
these authors have done, then, is to say that voting can be made a 
rational act by changing the definition of rationality. In doing so, to be 
sure, they are following the lead of Riker and Ordeshook, in their 1969 
APSR article. These theorists are somewhat more explicit in explaining 
( again in a footnote) that they have adopted a broader conception of 
rationality , recognizing its tautological character. They define rationality 
as "the ability to order preferences and to choose the more preferred 
action over the less preferred," and say that "in this sense, almost all 
behavior is rational ... " 13 
Riker/Ordeshook, Ferejohn/Fiorina, and Strom are all disturbed at 
the idea that voting may be an irrational act . Riker and Ordeshook say 
that their interest lies not with any ideological embarrassment which 
may result from this idea, but with the "bizarre" character of a non-
explanatory theory. They write that "it is clearly no explanation to 
assign a sizeable part of politics to the mysterious and inexplicable world 
of the irrational." 14 Ferejohn and Fiorina echo these words, but com-
plain that the earlier authors have not satisfactorily solved the problem. 111 
Finally , and most recently, Strom says: 
If Downs is correct, at least half of the American electorate is 
irrational. But of what validity is a rational choice theory which 
characterizes most individuals as irrational? 16 
The above statements indicate a profound misunderstanding of the 
nature of "rationality." To begin with , Strom is unfair to Downs. Downs 
claimed only that voting is likely to be economically irrational, and was 
quite willing to admit that the voting act might be rational in non-
economic terms. The subsequent theorists cited , however , apparently 
believe that economic rationality-defined as broadly as possible--is 
the only kind of rationality. Furthermore , they see irrationality as the 
only alternative to rationality. This is unfortunate, not only because it is 
untrue, but also because the term "irrational" has negative connotations 
in our culture. It is bad to be irrational. "Irrational" is also undesirable 
to these writers in a social science sense, in that the term seems to imply 
"inexplicable ," and the purpose of a theory is, of course, to explain. 
13 Riker and Ordeshook, pp. 26-27. 
14 Ibid., p. 25. 
111 Ferejohn and Fiorina, p. 525. 
16 Strom, p. 908. 
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None of these conclusions is valid. Economic rationality is not the 
only kind of rationality, and serious difficulties follow when this claim 
is made. An action which is not rational is not necessarily irrational, 
and a "non-rational" action need not be considered inexplicable or bad. 
It is a peculiar characteristic of the "voting paradox" literature that 
so many of its difficulties may be resolved by a re-reading of An Eco-
nomic Theory of Democracy, the book which provoked the entire con-
troversy. I have already noted the tendency of subsequent writers to 
reach "new" conclusions by re-defining "rationality." In broadening their 
definitions, however, these authors lose sight of the ambiguities, conflicts, 
and limitations inherent in the concept. They forget, for example, that 
rational behavior requires a predictable social order. Downs makes this 
clear in arguing that an economically rational man who knows what his 
preferred ends are cannot decide how to act in a chaotic, quasi-Hob-
besian "state of nature." 
Because government provides the framework of order upon which 
the rest of society is built, political rationality has a function much 
more fundamental than the mere elimination of waste in governing. 
Rational behavior is impossible without the ordered stability which 
government furnishes . But government will continue to furnish such 
stability only so long as it is rational. Thus political rationality is the 
sine qua non of all forms of rational behavior. 17 
If Downs is correct , all rationality is contextual. In the absence of a 
context, action is not irrational ( which implies an incorrect decision), 
but simply non-rational ( which means that correct decisions are not 
possible). It also follows from what Downs has written that there are 
different types of rationality ( political and economic at a minimum). 
And while this is less clearly implied, each type of rationality is ap-
plicable and relevant only under certain conditions. 
Ironically , the "voting paradox" theorists, though for the most part 
political scientists and not economists like Downs, neglect political 
rationality . These writers rarely, if ever , explain voting in terms of the 
electoral function of maintaining the stability and legitimacy of the 
political order. 18 It is important to understand just why this happens. 
The explanation, it seems to me, is very simple: the "political" function 
of elections does not fall within the economic definition of rationality. 
Political rationality can be independent of individual, purposive be-
17 Downs, pp . 10-11. 
IS Shapiro, cited above, does distinguish between different aspects or '1evels" 
of rationality, and is cognizant of political issues. 
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bavior. Large numbers of people may vote because they consider it 
their duty to do so, but very few, it would seem, vote because they 
consider their vote to be required for the continued stability of the 
political system. Furthermore, even those who do believe this are likely 
to be mistaken. Several years ago, Seymour Martin Lipset popularized 
( but did not originate) the idea that a very high level of participation 
may be harmful to a democracy. 19 Political rationality is not primarily 
a purpose of voting ; it is a possible function of elections. Elections 
may serve to legitimate a political system ( although in some circum-
stances an election may polarize the citizenry and in effect delegitimate 
the system ) , but this does not mean that people consciously do or 
should vote for this reason. Indeed, the stability of political systems 
does not depend in any very direct manner upon the conscious intent of 
individual citizens. All this is to say that political rationality is in large 
part reflected in collective and systemic behavior patterns, rather than 
in individual actions, or in actions of single organizations. Elections may 
thus be politically rational at the same time that voting is economically 
irrational for individuals. 
Downs noted the interdependence of economic and political ra-
tionality, but it is also necessary to see the potential for conflict and 
incongruence between these and other types of rationality. Students of 
comparative politics, for example, have seen that the "rational" process 
of economic development is not always conducive to the equally "ra-
tional" process of political development. 20 This point is also made in 
Paul Diesing's book, Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and 
Their Social Conditions (1962), 21 upon which my own understanding of 
"rationality" is fundamentally based. Attempts to predict, explain, or 
describe the individual voting act entirely in terms of means-end ra-
tionality are thus futile. In fact, much of the value of voting may depend 
upon economically irrational behavior. Elections give people a chance 
to express themselves and to enjoy a sense of participation. As Edelman 
observes, however, such participation is largely in the nature of a 
rihialistic act: 
Like all ritual, whether in primitive or modem societies, elections 
draw attention to common social ties and to the importance and 
apparent reasonableness of accepting the public policies that are 
19 Political Man (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p . 14. 
20 Samuel P. Huntington notes that the frequency of revolution in Latin American 
countries is directly related to levels of economic development. Political Order in 
Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 44. 
21 ( Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood, 1975), p. 7. 
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adopted. Without some such device no polity can survive and re-
tain the support or acquiescence of its members. The key point is, 
however , that elections could not serve this vital social function 
if the common belief in direct popular control over governmental 
policy through elections were to be widely questioned . The in-
sistence of the most involved upon general participation in the rite 
is both understandable and functional in this light. So is the im-
pression individual voters have of the reasoned basis for their votes.22 
Considerable confusion might be avoided if formal theorists would 
adopt the multi-faceted conception of "rationality" elaborated in Reason 
in Society. 23 Diesing describes two "aspects" and five types of rationality. 
The "substantial" and "functional" aspects of rationality are described 
as follows: 
A decision or action is substantially rational when it takes account 
of the possibilities and limitations of a given situation and re-
organizes it so as to produce, or increase, or preserve, some good. 
. . . An organization is functionally rational . . . when it is so struc-
tured as to produce, or increase, or preserve, some good in a con-
sistent , dependable fashion. 24 
Formal theorists and many policy analysts tend to neglect the functional 
aspect of rationality. The central point, however, is that Diesing describes 
and interrelates five types of rationality: technical, economic, social, legal 
and political. The limitations of an analysis framed in terms of one type 
of rationality can thus be seen in light of the other modes of practical 
reason. Diesing ' s description of social rationality is particularly relevant 
to the question of voting. It thus seems appropriate-without describing 
all five types of reason-to contrast his conception of social rationality 
with Downs' view of economic rationality , which has already been pre-
sented. 
Diesing describes rationality in terms of effectiveness, which he 
sees as being "the successful production of any kind of value, leaving 
22 Edelman, p. 3. 
23 Riker and Zavoina mention Reason in Society in a footnote , but have not 
adopted Diesing's conceptualization of "rationality." 
24 A substantially rational decision: 
"must be an effective response to the situation in that it produces some possible 
good, and the effectiveness must be based on intelligent insight rather than on 
luck." 
With respect to functional rationality: 
"The consistently good results must be based primarily on an internal structure 
which is able to continue effective operation through variations of personnel and 
through changes of environment" ( Diesing, pp. 3-4). 
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open and problematic the question of what kinds of value there may be." 
Efficiency is simply a special kind of effectiveness. The value of efficiency 
is relevant to, and indeed defines, technical and economic rationality. 
Technical rationality is the efficient achievement of a single goal, and 
economic rationality is "the maximum achievement of a plurality of 
goals. 2ff The economic definition of rationality can be expanded, but 
to do so-as has been done by proponents of systems analysis and pro-
gram budgeting, as well as by our formal theorists 26-is to risk missing 
important distinctions 27 and to ignore potential conflicts between the 
different types of rationality. 
Social rationality , to Diesing, is the rationality of social systems. 
The basic trend of isolated social systems is toward greater integration, 
which produces stability and resistance to change because of the mutual 
support provided by the parts of an integrated social network. 
A social system is integrated when the roles of which it is composed 
are internally consistent and fit together. More specifically, it is 
integrated when all the obligations belonging to a single role are 
consistent with one another, when the obligations of each role agree 
with the expectations other people have for that role, when both 
obligations and expectations are as consistent with ideals as external 
circumstances permit , and when the sequence of roles a person is 
expected to take are so similar and graduated that it is psychologi-
cally possible to grow into each successive role.28 
Diesing argues that the integrative trend would not be universal 
if it were not effective in some fundamental sense. This effectiveness, he 
writes , is that of promoting action. 
Integration is a logical precondition for the successful completion 
of any social action. It makes action possible by ( 1) channeling 
the necessary emotional energy and preventing it from being 
diffused and lost; ( 2) eliminating conflicts, which would block 
action; ( 3) providing supporting factors which strengthen action 
and carry it to completion. Also ( 4) it makes action meaningful 
by relating it to past actions which it fulfills and to future actions 
which preserve and continue its achievement. An isolated action, 
211 Diesing, pp . 1-3. 
26 See Aaron Wildavslcy, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," Public Administration Review 
26 ( December 1966) : 292. 
27 See Diesing, pp. 2-3. 
28 Ibid., p . 76. 
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with no history and no consequences , is insignificant; it disappears 
and is forgotten. 29 
The fundamental characteristics of an integrated social system ( role 
consistency, fitness of pairs of roles, continuity of role sequences, and 
adaptation to environment) become more pronounced as integration 
procedes. Moreover, these structural characteristics imply a value system 
characterized by particularism, ascription and loyalty-values normally 
not conducive to means-end rationality. 80 
The contrast between particularism, loyalty, and ascription values 
and universalism, impartiality and achievement values is part of a 
larger contrast between the ideally rational social and economic 
organization. These two stand as polar opposites in most respects. 
A social mode of organization relates and unites people with per-
sonal ties; an economic mode of organization separates people and 
things into distinct commodities. Each social relation is unique , 
personal , irreplaceable; each commodity is impersonal and inter-
changeable with all others. 31 
Maximizing (economic) decisions begin with given ends, which are 
treated as isolated entities and are compared on some scale. In inte-
grative (social) decision-making, ends are treated as symbols of hidden 
values, fears, and strains. There are no definite ends, means, or predicta-
ble outcomes , 'because the desires and interests that could serve as 
ends are subject to unpredictable changes in the course of a de-
cision . . . 32 The means-end approach, which is characteristic of eco-
nomic rationality , is essentially irrelevant. Only general situational goals 
such as "increase of problem-solving ability, balance of tension and 
29 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
so For a defense of this position, see ibid ., pp . 90-91. 
81 Ibid., pp. 91-92. An interesting, although implicit, discussion of social ra-
tionality is found in Victims of Groupthink, by Irving L. Janis (Boston: Houghton 
MifHin Co., 1967). Janis describes "Groupthink" as "a deterioration of mental 
efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pre ssures" 
(p. 9) . He gives the following example: 
"When conducting research on groups of heavy smokers at a clinic set up to 
help people stop smoking, I noticed a seemingly irrational tendency for the 
members to exert pre ssure on each other to increase their smoking as the time 
for the final meeting approached . This appeared to be a collusive effort to display 
mutual dependence and resistance to the termination of the group sessions" ( ibid . 
p . 8). 
What Janis considers an irrational tenden cy would be an example of social rationality 
in Diesing' s framework. The fundamental problem with this book is that of failing 
to recognize the necessity of social rationality or Groupthink . People cannot function 
without emotional support. 
82 Paul Diesing, "Socioeconomic Decisions," Ethics 69 ( October 1958) : 2. 
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ego-strength or improvement of communication ... " are at all relevant-
and these are not homogeneous, quantifiable goals.33 Integrative and 
economic decision-making also differ in that the former is largely an 
unconscious process in individuals and groups. But in spite of these 
differences, each type of decision-making depends upon and presupposes 
the other. The stability provided by integrated social organizations and 
personalities is a prerequisite for the existence of stable goals, and thus 
means-end reasoning. At the same time, socially rational organizations 
can only survive if they are economically rational to some extent. 34 
Diesing's description of social rationality is of obvious relevance to 
the "darkly functional social behavior suffused with myth and ritual" 
that is voting. Tullock' s point that social pressure often leads people to 
vote is explicable in this context, as are arguments to the effect that 
voting and other political activity may be psychologically functional for 
an individual. 35 That is, a "civic minded" peer group may, in both con-
as Ibid., pp. 2-3. On p. 45 of Reason. in Society, Diesing writes that: 
" ... economizing is possible only insofar as the problematic, alternative ends are 
comparable on some scale. When this condition is not met, there is no way of 
finding out which end or combination of ends will bring the greatest return, and 
so there is no economic way of choosing among them. For example, it is difficult 
to compare the value of going to church on Sunday with the value of conversation 
with a friend, in terms of which would bring the greatest return, supposing that 
the two were somehow alternative . The two are hardly comparable since there 
is no unit of measurement common to both of them. The two values are, indeed , 
hardly measurable at all; both of them are, traditionally at least, absolute values, 
not susceptible to division into parts or change of degree." 
34 Ibid., p. 95. 
35 Diesing's conception of social rationality seems more useful than the alternatives 
to utility maximizing theory which have been proposed by some formal theorists . 
Riker and Zavoina, for example, in their 1970 APSR article, write that learning 
theory and psychoanalytic theory compete with utility theory as explanatory models 
of political behavior (pp. 49-50). There are several problems with this approach. 
One is that; the economic model refers to "rational" action, while the other models 
deal with "irration al" and thus implicitly inferior modes of behavior. Second, psych~ 
analytic theory and learning theory are evidently used as individualistic models. Con-
sequently, they neglect "functional" rationality and do not adequately explain group 
behavior--e.g. Tullock's point about social pressure leading to voting. Diesing's 
broader conception of social rationality more easily incorporates psychological and 
sociological variables. Third, Riker and Zavoina, finding no suitable way to integrate 
the conllicting theories, attempt to choose betwe en them. Thus, they conclude that 
"utility maximization is the theory that fits political behavior best." Ibid., p. 60. 
This would seem to be the wrong approach. It is acceptable to argue that utility 
maximization may flt one type of political behavior better than another. For ex-
ample, means-end rationality might be better suited for an analysis of candidate 
electoral strategy than for a study of mass voting patterns . It is unacceptable, how-
ever, to argue that one model is most appropriate to all political analysis, all of the 
time, thereby eliminating alternative explanations without serious refutation. 
For a more sophisticated effort to integrate economic and non-economic ex-
planatory models, see John C. Harsanyi's article, "Rational-Choice Models of Political 
Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories," World Politics 21 ( July 1969): 
513-538. However, even in Harsanyi's article, there are seeds of trouble in the author's 
12 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
scious and unconscious fashion, induce an otherwise politically apathetic 
person to vote. In such a situation, voting would serve to integrate 
and/or prevent conflict in the peer group. It is likewise well known that 
some people find stimulation and emotional release in politics, as well 
as in religion and other activities. Voting and other forms of political 
action are socially rational in this sense as well, in that the activity pro-
vides a channel and integrative focus for the emotional energy of the 
individual in question. Politics may also create meaning by relating his 
actions to a larger context. This does not mean that technical or economic 
modes of rationality are irrelevant to the voting act. Much voting can 
indeed be seen as reflecting calculations of means and ends. My point . 
is rather that several types and aspects of rationality are reflected in the 
voting act. 
An extreme example may serve to illustrate the point that multiple 
types of rationality are necessarily manifested in voting decisions. Ma-
chine politics, as traditionally practiced in American cities , is such an 
example. Banfield and Wilson write that a political "machine" is a party 
organization that depends crucially upon specific and material induce-
ments. 36 They write: 
A political machine is a business organization in a particular field 
of business-getting votes and winning elections. As a Chicago 
Machine boss once said of the machine in that city, it is 'just like 
any sales organization trying to sell its product.' 37 
If there is any type of voting which is susceptible to explanation and 
description in terms of economic , means-end rationality , it is surely 
voting in the "ideal" machine politics situation. The voter casts his ballot 
for the candidate designated by the precinct captain without considera-
conclusion that the functionalist or conformist model is a special case of the cogni-
tive-utilitarian model of social theory (p. 531 ). In Diesing's terminology, this is 
equivalent to the claim that social rationality is but a special case of economic ra-
tionality. Once again, a corrective may be found in Reason in Society. As Diesing 
writes: 
u • •• a poor society could conceivably be ahnost untroubled by scarcity, in the 
sense that culturally determined ends were relatively satiable by available re-
sources and modes of production. Such a society would have no well-developed 
economy, but only a series of separate productive techniques" (p. 18). 
In the society described above, technical, social, legal, and perhaps political rationality 
would exist, but economic rationality would not . Economic rationality would appear 
only with the advent of economic progress, bringing in its wake the perception of 
scarcity. Social rationality could thus not be a special case of economic rationality . 
86 Edward C. Ban.6eld and James Q. Wilson, City Politics ( New York: Vintage 
Books, 1963), p. 115. 
37 Ibid. 
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tion of the merits of the candidate or of political principle. This is done 
in the expectation of favorable treatment by the political authorities, 
should the need arise. The arrangement is technically rational so long 
as both parties achieve their goals-i.e. machine candidates regularly 
win primary elections , the precinct captain gets a patronage job, and 
garbage is collected on time in the neighborhood. The machine is 
economically rational , however, only to the extent that participants maxi-
mize their utility through a correct choice of means. That is, while a 
"ward healer" may still be helpful in obtaining a job for a constituent, 
it may no longer be "rational" for this constituent to cooperate with the 
"healer" if a comparable or better job is to be had without such inter-
vention. 
A machine is distinguished from other types of political organization 
in that specific, material incentives are employed in order to secure 
dependable results at election time. However, even though the classic 
machine exists for itself, and is indifferent to matters of principle, it is 
crucial for our purposes to understand that machines cannot survive 
on the basis of material incentives alone. To cite Banfield and Wilson 
once more: 
Even though the precinct captain asks for something that is almost 
worthless to the [generally lower-class] voter , he must offer some-
thing in return. What he offers is usually a personal , nonmateri al 
incentive, 'friendship.' A Chicago captain explained, 'I never ta1ce 
leaflets or mention issues or conduct rallies in my precinct. After 
all, this is a question of personal friendship between me and my 
neighbors. 38 
Political machines indeed off er favors of various kinds, but they 
cannot afford to pay cash to all voters. This means that even in machine 
politics, voting is largely based upon affect, and reflects social, as well 
as technical and economic rationality. Again, voting in such situations 
is largely based upon friendship , or more generally, upon the voters' 
participation and emotional involvement in a community-wide network 
of ethnic-familial ties linked to the political system. It might be replied 
at this point that friendship too can be a matter of means-end calcul a-
tion , and that this pattern of voter motivation may also be understo od 
on the basis of economic rationality . However, while it is true that 
"friendship" in one sense may be understood in terms of means -end 
rationality, the meaning of the term changes considerably when used in 
38 Ibid., p. 117. 
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this manner. The friendship of a prostitute or of a geisha girl is indeed 
something which can be bought and sold, and which has a definite 
price. Such friendship is a commodity , and its value can be compared 
in monetary terms to the value of alternative commodities. However, 
even here, an element of social rationality is involved. Prostitutes are 
paid in good part to create the illusion that the client is valued as a 
person , and for his own sexual attraction , rather than simply for his 
money. And to be persuasive , such an illusion must be based partly 
upon fact. Similarly , while the friendship of the precinct captain is no 
doubt calculated , it must also be partially genuine-meaning that it is 
valued in and of itself, and in some degree reflects an emotional response 
which occurs independently of conscious decision-making. On the part 
of machine voters, perhaps less calculation is involved, with a greater 
share of the motivation to vote being friendship, or possibly the attrac-
tive aura of power which surrounds a successful politician, and which 
invites identification. 
In more abstract terms, the difference between calculated and 
"genuine" friendship reflects the difference between economic and non-
economic activity. As Diesing writes , an economy is that part of a so-
ciety's institutions devoted to the production, exchange, and distribution 
of commodities. It is an open system, with both inputs and outputs. 
Consumption is the ultimate goal of an economy, while matter and 
energy are the ultimate means. However, neither goals nor means are 
themselves part of the economy. Rather, they set the limits of economic 
activity. The difference between production_ and consumption, economic 
and non-economic activity, is a valuational, means-end distinction. 39 
Those activities whose occurrence needs to be justified by its results 
are economic, while those activities whose occurrence provides a 
justification for other activities but does not itself need justification 
are noneconomic. Eating, learning , and exercising are productive 
activities if they are justified by their effect on the productivity of 
labor; they constitute consumption if they are regarded as the 
maintenance of a standard of living. Production is the creation of 
an instrumental value while consumption is the achievement of an 
intrinsic value. 40 
It seems clear then, that machine politics involves both "economic" 
and noneconomic activity, and thus both technical/ economic rationality 
89 Diesing, Reason in Society, pp. 14-15. 
40 Ibid., p. 15. 
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and social rationality. And if social rationality is to be found in machine 
politics voting , it is surely to be found in all voting. 
This example could be extended to embrace the other types of 
rationality which Diesing describes. Legal rationality , for example, is 
seen as the rationality of fundamental rules, embracing not only con-
stitutions and laws, but also the moral order and elements of the status 
system as well.41 Voting on the basis of felt-obligation might be explained 
along these lines. Political rationality , on the other hand , might be ob-
served in the vote of an individual who chooses to support a particular 
ticket in order to promote strong , as opposed to weak, government-
to the extent that such a vote is intended to create or perpetuate an 
effective decision-making structure , and does not simply reflect an au-
thoritarian personality. 42 
For our purposes, it is enough to say that the meaning of the voting 
act cannot be determined once and for all; it clearly changes according 
to the highly complex and variable contexts in which voting occurs. 
In the classic machine-politics of the "delivery wards," economic, means-
end rationality may furnish the most reliable and satisfactory single-
mode explanations. In another context, social rationality may be the 
dominant influence upon voting behavior. For example, in an election 
polarized along racial lines, the pull of group identity, in response to 
perceived threats and individual needs for reassurance, would most 
likely be the dominant factor influencing voting decisions, overriding 
generalized norms of right and wrong, and overshadowing underlying 
"economic" causes of conflict. Social/psychological explanations of voting 
are often decisive in another way as well, to the extent that the key 
factor of party identification is based upon socialization and affect, 
rather than upon conscious calculation. In non-controversial elections, 
a decision to go to the polls might be based upon "legal" rationality-Le. 
the belief that one has a duty to vote-while the content of the vote 
might be more appropriately explained in terms of social rationality-i.e. 
party identification or affect. 
It is generally agreed that Anthony Downs decisively increased our 
understanding of politics by investigating political behavior from an 
economic perspective. The virtue of economic analysis lies in its rigor 
and simplicity. The danger lies in hoping, to the point of believing, 
that such rigor and simplicity can be extended to all aspects of politics. 
The persistent attempts by formal theorists to refute Downs' claim that 
41 Legal rationality is discussed in Reason in Society, pp. 124-168. 
½2For a discussion of political rationality, see ibid., pp . 169-234. 
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voting may be economically irrational can be seen as efforts to bre ak 
through the boundaries of economic reasoning. This has been attempt ed 
by expanding the economic definition of rationality to the point th at 
it presumably encompasses nearly all behavior. I have argued that thi s 
approach is mistaken. It remains only to ask how scholars could be-
Jieve, in the face of all evidence, that voting can be adequately unde r-
stood in terms of economic rationality. 
Perhaps our words deceive us. Since the eighteenth century, and 
before , "Reason" has been a beacon for enlightened men. Reason, flowered 
into Science , has promised to free us from poverty, war, and ignorance. 
Rationality is man's salvation and irrationality the path toward destru c-
tion. It is the language of good and evil; there is no middle groun d. 
Moreover , Reason has been seen in Anglo-American culture as char-
acteristic of individuals, not groups. Emerging from an England ex-
periencing industrialization and concomitant rapid economic growth , 
Reason evolved into Utilitarianism, which, as Diesing writes, has domi-
nated Western ethical thought for two centuries. 
The main ideas of this theory appear in a number of schools of 
thought which disagree in details . . . but there is widesprea d 
agreement that the good is something that is maximizable, th at 
it is an end to be achieved by the wise use of means, that it is 
scarce in the sense that possession by one individual preven ts 
possession by others, and that people are impartially entitled to a 
chance to pursue it.43 
Economic rationality has come to be synonymous with rationality, just 
as economic progress was once synonymous with progress. 
Perhaps the formal theorists have done us a service in carrying the 
"voting paradox" argument to extreme conclusions. These conclusions are 
either that voting is irrational or that the concept of "rationality" is 
ambiguous. 44 Unacceptable conclusions lead to the questioning of initi al 
premises, and in this case the questionable premise is that there can be 
but one kind of rationality. For when Anthony Downs reasoned tha t 
voting may be economically irrational, the lesson we should have learne d 
is that not all rationality is economic. 
43 Diesing, Reason in Society, p. 37. 
44 See Riker and Zavoina, p. 50. Here, the authors note that in the earlier Riker 
and Ordeshook article, which attempted to interpret voting on the basis of utility 
theory, one term of the equation looks as if it had originated in learning theory. But 
since they concede that learning theory decisions are not based upon calculations of 
utility, the concept of rationality employed in the earlier article was clearly ambiguous. 
